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Punitive Damages in Australian Law
MICHAEL TILBURY* AND HAROLD LuNTz**
The Smith v. MegaFood hypothetical raises interesting
questions for Australian law. Most of these questions relate to
MegaFood's liability to Smith rather than to the recovery of
damages. Questions relating to punitive damages can arise only if
we assume MegaFood's liability to Smith. If we make this assump-
tion, however, the fact situation illustrates the uncertainties of the
Australian law of punitive damages. These uncertainties spring
from the tension between a hostility toward punitive damages
inherited from English law, and a modem tendency to embrace, or
at least to concede, the availability of such damages.
Part I sketches the Australian social environment, which may
explain to readers unfamiliar with Australian culture why the
scenario on which we are asked to comment is unlikely to arise in
Australia. Part II makes certain modifications to the hypothetical
to reflect the essential differences between the legal environments
of Australia and the United States, especially regarding the
possible bases of MegaFood's liability. Parts III and IV discuss the
substance of punitive damages. Part V addresses the quantum of
punitive damages on the assumption that they are available to
Smith. Part VI concludes that Australian courts probably would
not uphold an award of $3.5 million even if MegaFood were liable.
I. THE SOCIAL SETrING
Since the mid-1970s, Australia has had a universal health
insurance scheme known as "Medicare" funded by a Federal
Government levy on taxpayers and general revenue.' Medicare
is supplemented by a highly regulated private hospital insurance
system to which a substantial, although diminishing, proportion of
the population subscribes. Knowing that they are covered for
* Commissioner, New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Sydney, Australia;
Edward Jenks Professor of Law, The University of Melbourne.
** George Paton Professor of Law, The University of Melbourne.
1. Health Insurance Act (1973).
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virtually all future hospital and medical expenses, many injured
persons are not under pressure to invoke the torts system to
provide for their urgent needs. Theoretically, as a matter of law,
Medicare and private hospital insurance benefits are not payable
where an entitlement exists to damages or compensation.
Although provisional payments may be made pending the
establishment of any such entitlement, in practice, many injured
persons do not take steps to prove their entitlement. Because
Medicare and, to a lesser extent, private insurance do not cover
ancillary services such as physiotherapy, there remains some
incentive to sue in serious cases.
Australia also enjoys a non-contributory, highly targeted and
means-tested income support system provided by the Common-
wealth (Federal) Government.2 This system pays benefits such as
sickness allowance3 and disability support pension4 when the
recipient cannot work, irrespective of the cause of the incapacity.
The sickness allowance becomes payable after a comparatively
short waiting period and is intended for short-term incapacity for
work. In the case of long-term incapacity for work, the disability
support pension continues until the recipient becomes eligible for
the old age pension, which, similarly, is non-contributory and
means-tested. The payments represent about twenty-five percent
of a single person's average weekly earnings or forty percent of a
married couple's average weekly earnings, and are supplemented
in many instances by a range of other allowances. Although far
from generous, payments such as these ensure that the victims of
torts as well as other misfortunes are not left destitute if they are
unable to recover damages or compensation. Despite some verbal
attacks on "dole-bludgers," the stigma of being dependent on
welfare benefits probably is less than in some other countries.
Benefits under the Social Security Act of 1991, which are not
means-tested, include a child disability allowance5 and a mobility
allowance.6 Nursing homes are subsidized and the National
Health Act of 1973 (hereinafter "Health Act") assists domiciliary
2. See, e.g., Social Security Act (1991); National Health Act (1973); Disabilities Act
(1986).
3. Social Security Act § 666 (1991).
4. Id § 94.
5. Id.
6. Id § 1035.
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nursing care.7  The Health Act also contains provisions
authorizing a Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme. In addition, the
Disability Services Act of 1986 provides for rehabilitation and
other services for persons with disabilities.' In light of these
multiple provisions, the pressure to sue is clearly not the same as
in the United States.
Those who nevertheless want to sue face barriers not found
in other jurisdictions. Until recently, no contingent fee system
existed. The torts of maintenance9 and champerty0 effectively
prevented lawyers from supporting litigation or sharing in the
proceeds. Although some jurisdictions now have legislatively
abrogated these ancient torts, legislation maintains as unenfor-
ceable agreements to share the proceeds of litigation.1 Thus, at
best, a lawyer can hope to recover only a small percentage above
the scale fees on a contingent basis. Legal aid funds are far from
plentiful and not readily available to indigent tort victims.
Furthermore, the rules for costs require the losing party to pay a
large portion of the winner's costs, thus providing a strong
deterrent for anyone with a home 2 or other assets to risk the
uncertainty of litigation.
Success in litigation does not guarantee wealth. Due to
overestimation of the investment benefits of lump sum damages
and underestimation of the effects of inflation, the courts tradition-
ally heavily discount damages for lost income and outlays on
nursing and other medical expenses. The relatively parsimonious
sums so estimated are then further discounted, to an arguably
excessive degree, for contingencies or "the vicissitudes of life." No
allowance has to be made for attorney contingent fees. As a
result, the pain and suffering component will look ludicrously small
7. National Health Act (1973).
8. Disability Services Act (1986).
9. In the context of lawsuits, maintenance is defined as "[a]n officious intermeddling
in a lawsuit by a non-party by maintaining, supporting or assisting either party, with money
or otherwise, to prosecute or defend the litigation." BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 954 (6th
ed. 1990).
10. Champerty is defined as "[a] bargain between a stranger and a party to a lawsuit
by which the stranger pursues the party's claim in consideration of receiving part of any
judgment proceeds; it is one type of 'maintenance,' the more general term which refers to
maintaining, supporting, or promoting another person's litigation." Id. at 231.
11. See, e.g., Maintenance and Champerty Abolition Act (1993) (N.S.W.); Wrongs Act
§ 32 (1958) (Vic.).
12. Most Australians own their own homes.
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to U.S. eyes. Punitive damages, as we shall see, are a rarity. Thus,
the Australian system contains none of the same incentives to sue
as are observed in the United States.13
Another factor that affects the volume of tort litigation is that,
until recently, personal injury lawyers had little inducement to
innovate. Most litigation resulted from motor or industrial
accidents because workers' compensation legislation did not
provide exclusive remedies against employers. The defendants in
such actions were compulsorily insured, even if they were drivers
of stolen vehicles. In the rare cases in which the driver was not
insured or in which the actual tortfeasor could not be found, the
nominal defendants paid the damages out of funds contributed by
all licensed insurers. Unlike the United States, such insurance was
unlimited. Therefore, there was no need to find some other
defendants, such as a dram shop proprietor or social host.
Recently, this scenario has begun to change. No-fault motor
schemes have high thresholds for tort recovery, and workers'
compensation is becoming an exclusive remedy. Some view
medical liability as a growing area of litigation, but the cost of
protection by medical defense associations still is far below the
level of premiums paid to private insurers in the United States,
and is indicative of fewer suits and generally lower damages.
The Smith v. MegaFood scenario does not state from where
the 750 prior lawsuits have been brought against MegaFood. For
all the reasons spelled out in this part, few would have been
launched in Australia. This does not mean that tort law reform
14
is not part of Australia's political agenda. Recently, New South
Wales enacted legislation providing for the capping of professional
13. Cf. J. Fitzgerald, Grievances, Disputes & Outcomes: A Comparison of Australia and
the United States, 1 LAw IN CONTEXT 15 (1983). For a reworking of some of Fitzgerald's
data, see Herbert M. Kritzer, Propensity to Sue in England and the United States of
America: Blaming and Claiming in Tort Cases, 18 J.L. & SOC'Y 400 (1991). For criticism,
see Sally Lloyd-Bostock, Propensity to Sue in England and the United States of America:
The Role of Attribution Processes, 18 J.L. & SOC'Y 428 (1991).
14. Australians would understand this to include defamation law reform. Lacking an
express equivalent to the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, Australia has in some
eyes become the defamation capital of the world. Very recent decisions of the High Court
have found an implied right to political free speech in the Australian Constitution. See
Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times Ltd., 124 A.L.R. 1 (1994) (Austl.); Stephens v.
West Australian Newspapers Ltd., 124 A.L.R. 80 (1994) (Austl.). Meanwhile, reform of
defamation law has been the subject of inquiry after inquiry and is currently in the
forefront of the activities of the New South Wales Law Reform Commission. See also
Defamation Amendment Act (1994) (N.S.W.).
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liability in the context of the adoption of insurance schemes by
professional associations.1 5  Three other jurisdictions have
abolished joint and several liability and provided new fixed
limitation periods in the construction industry.16 A Government-
sponsored inquiry has recommended the more general abolition of
joint and several liability." A noteworthy feature of these three
initiatives, however, is that they exclude liability for personal
injury. The main concern is the perceived burgeoning liability for
pure economic loss. In personal injury litigation, thresholds,
capping, and other measures to limit damages have been intro-
duced almost exclusively in relation to motor and industrial
accidents."8
II. MODIFICATIONS OF THE HYPOTHETICAL
A. Terminology
In Australian law, we tend to speak of "exemplary" rather
than "punitive" damages. At first sight, this seems a mere matter
of terminology; it is, however, much more. The distinction points
to the origins of our modern law of exemplary damages, and to
some of the difficulties occasioned by those origins.
The genesis of modern Australian law of exemplary damages
occurred in 1964, in Lord Devlin's speech in Rookes v. Barnard.9
In his speech before the English House of Lords, Lord Devlin did
two important things. First, he attempted to impose a uniform
terminology on certain areas of the law of damages. 20 Before
1964, the cases speak indiscriminately of "punitive," "exemplary,"
"vindictive," "aggravated," and "retributory" damages. Lord
Devlin pointed out that the purpose of damages in many of these
cases was compensatory rather than punitive.2 He sought to
make clear the conceptual distinction between damages aimed at
15. Profession Standards Act (1994) (N.S.W.).
16. See Development Act, §§ 72-73 (1993) (S.A.); Building Act, Pt. 9, Division 2
(1993) (Vic.); Building Act, §§ 155-62 (1993) (N.T.). This is again in the context of
compulsory insurance schemes.
17. J.L.R. DAVIS, REPORT OF STAGE TWO OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE LAW OF JOINT
AND SEVERAL LIABILITY (1995).
18. See, e.g., Motor Accidents Act, Pt. 6 (1988) (N.S.W.); Workers Compensation Act,
Pt. 5 (1987) (N.S.W.).
19. 1964 App. Cas. 1129.
20. Id. at 1220-25.
21. See Lamb v. Cotogno, 164 C.L.R. 1, 8 (1987).
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compensation and those aimed at punishment. Lord Devlin styled
the latter "exemplary damages."2  Compensatory damages seek
to restore the plaintiff to its position before the wrong or tort;
exemplary damages aim to punish and deter.2  Lord Devlin's
purpose was to clarify that many of the pre-1964 cases purporting
to award exemplary damages actually had awarded compensatory
damages, and could only be justified as such. Indeed, few cases
truly awarded exemplary damages.
The second matter to which Lord Devlin directed his attention
was why exemplary damages were recoverable in some cases and
not in others. In a magisterial passage in which other members of
the House concurred, Lord Devlin restated the circumstances in
which exemplary damages were recoverable at common law.
24
He limited recovery to three categories of cases: (1) government
servants have acted in an oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional
action; (2) the defendant has calculated that the profit to be made
from a course of conduct is likely to exceed any compensation
payable to the plaintiff; and (3) the exemplary damages are
awardable by statute. We refer to this second aspect of the
decision as Lord Devlin's restatement.
Lord Devlin's restatement proved controversial in England,
but was confirmed by the House of Lords in Broome v. Cassell &
Co.5 The High Court of Australia firmly rejected it, however, in
Uren v. John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd.26  That rejection was
remarkable on two scores. First, it came at a time when, as a
matter of practice, Australian courts tended to follow the decisions
of the English House of Lords.27  Second, for the purposes of
22. Id.
23. See Lamb v. Cotogno, 164 C.L.R. 1, 8 (1987).
24. Rookes v. Barnard, 1964 App. Cas. 1129, 1225-27.
25. 1972 App. Cas. 1027. This was an appeal from the English Court of Appeal under
Lord Denning M.R.'s leadership, which had tried to subvert the decision in Rookes on the
technical ground that it had been reached per incuriam, i.e. by overlooking precedents
relevant to the decision of the case. Not surprisingly, the House of Lords was unimpressed
with this argument and effectively rebuked the Court of Appeal for its disloyalty.
26. 117 C.L.R. 118 (1966) (Austl.).
27. The reason was often stated to be the achievement of uniformity in the "common
law of the British Empire." For statements to this effect from the High Court of Australia,
see Webb v. Outtrim, 4 C.L.R. 356 (1906) (Austi.); Piro v. Foster & Co. Ltd., 68 C.L.R.
313 (1943) (Austl.); Ford v. Ford, 73 C.L.R. 524 (1947) (Austl.). See also Robins v.
National Trust Co., 1927 App. Cas. 515. But the practice began to break down in
Australia after the High Court decision in Parker v. The Queen, 111 C.L.R. 610 (1964).
Other than the practical force which attaches to it as the historical source of Australian
[Vol. 17:769
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Australian law, the Privy Council in England endorsed on appeal
the Australian High Court's rejection of Lord Devlin's restate-
ment.28 At that time, the Privy Council was the supreme appel-
late court in all non-constitutional matters from all Australian
jurisdictions.
29
The Australian rejection of Lord Devlin's restatement,
however, did not extend to a rejection either of his terminology or
of his analysis of the pre-1964 cases. Indeed, this aspect of Rookes
v. Barnard was expressly accepted for purposes of Australian law.
The new terminology was to be imposed on pre-1964 authorities
to determine what they "really" decided. A major problem
persists, however, because clearly setting out the circumstances in
which exemplary damages were recoverable before 1964 is difficult,
if not impossible. The determination of what is presently recover-
able in Australian law is equally difficult. Lord Devlin's starting
point, namely the hopelessly confused pre-1964 terminology,
provides the source of this difficulty. In other words, the clarifica-
tion of terminology without a restatement does not alleviate the
confusion in the absence of any attempt to examine the relevant
policy issues. 30 Such a restatement still should be made for
purposes of Australian law. Until then, many uncertainties
surround the circumstances in which exemplary damages are
recoverable in Australian law.
B. The Body Awarding Damages
In the hypothetical, the jury awards $100,000 in compensatory
damages, and $3.5 million in punitive damages. In most Australian
jurisdictions, judges rather than juries award both compensatory
and exemplary damages. South Australia endorses this practice by
legislative mandate abolishing the jury in all civil actions. In other
Australian jurisdictions, legislation tends to allow the parties to opt
law, English precedent is now, theoretically, treated no differently than other foreign
precedent in Australia. Its force in any case resides in the cogency of its reasoning. Cook
v. Cook, 162 C.L.R. 376, 390 (1986) (Austl.). See Harold Luntz, Throwing Off the Chains:
English Precedent and the Law of Torts in Australia, in THE EMERGENCE OF AUSTRALIAN
LAW, ch. 4 (M.P. Ellinghaus et al. eds., 1989).
28. Australian Consolidated Press Ltd. v. Uren, 117 C.L.R. 221 (1967) (Austl.), [19691
1 App. Cas. 590.
29. The Australian Act § 11 (1986) finally abolished appeals from Australian courts
to the Privy Council.
30. See HAROLD LUNTZ, ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY AND
DEATH 62-63 (3d ed. 1990).
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for trial by jury in civil actions, but maintains the court's discretion
to control that choice.31 In practice, the incidence of jury trials
in civil actions varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Except in
Victoria, however, the majority of civil actions do not use juries.
C. The Basis of the Defendant's Liability
Because of the uncertainties surrounding the recovery of
exemplary damages, the basis of the defendant's liability is a factor
of some importance. The purpose of this section, therefore, is to
examine the possible bases of MegaFood's liability to Smith under
Australian law.
1. The Importance of the Basis of the Defendant's Liability
There are two reasons for accurately defining the plaintiff's
cause of action in this case. First, under one view of Australian
law, the nature of the plaintiff's cause of action is crucial to
determining the availability of exemplary damages.32 Second, and
more fundamental, no question of exemplary damages exists unless
the defendant is liable to the plaintiff on some recognized basis.
Australian law does not provide independent action for exemplary
damages, considering such damages "parasitic"33 on compensatory
damages.' 4 Thus, in the context of this case, if MegaFood is not
liable to Smith for compensatory damages, it cannot be liable for
exemplary damages even if the court wished to punish and deter
MegaFood's conduct.35
31. See B.C. CAIRNS, AUSTRALIAN CIVIL PROCEDURE 461 (3d ed. 1992).
32. See infra Part III.B. for a discussion on this point.
33. They were so described by Justice Brennan in the High Court of Australia in XL
Petroleum (N.S.W.) Pty. Ltd. v. Caltex Oil (Austl.) Pty. Ltd., 155 C.L.R. 448, 468 (1985)
(Austl.).
34. But the suggestion by Justice Brennan that exemplary damages are always parasitic
on compensatory damages is too narrow because it ignores the fact that such damages are
competent even where there is an award of nominal damages. Id. at 468-69. See
MICHAEL J. TILBURY, 1 CIVIL REMEDIES 264 (1990).
35. In New Zealand, where statute abolishes the common law for personal injury, an
independent action in exemplary damages survives for such injury. Donselaar v.
Donselaar, [1984] 2 N.Z.L.R. 66. Where statute restricts or alters common law rights to
damages in Australia, rights to exemplary damages may be abolished. E.g., Motor
Accidents Act § 81A (1988) (N.S.W.) (personal injury in the context of motor accidents
compensation); Workers Compensation Act § 151R (1987) (N.S.W.) (personal injury in the
context of workers' compensation law).
776 [Vol. 17:769
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2. Particular Difficulty in Victoria
Since January 1, 1987, the State of Victoria has had in
operation a successful no-fault transport accident scheme36 that
severely restricts common law rights to sue for transport acci-
dents.3 7 In particular, except as otherwise provided, section 93(1)
of the Transport Accident Act prohibits the recovery of any
damages for the injury or death of a person as the result of a
transport accident. 3g This section does not provide recovery for
medical expenses paid under the no-fault scheme for an unlimited
time and to an unlimited extent or exemplary or punitive damages.
The definition of "transport accident '39 has narrowed. Originally,
the phrase was based on the standard formula used in Australia
for compulsory motor vehicle insurance ("an incident caused by or
arising out of the use of a motor car"), but some felt decisions of
the courts gave too broad a compass to this formula.' As a
result, the definition changed to an incident directly caused or
directly arising out of the driving of a motor car. Despite the
introduction of "directly" and the substitution of "driving" for
"use," however, the courts continued to reach decisions that the
legislature considered too favorable to claimants for no-fault
benefits.41 The most recent amendment defines a transport
accident as "an incident directly caused by the driving of a motor
car ... "42 Although the earlier definitions almost certainly
would have covered Smith's incident, it is possible that this last
definition will still apply to Smith's mishap. If the incident is
covered by the definition, a court could not lawfully award
damages for medical expenses or punitive damages.
3. Product Liability in Australian Law
In the United States, Smith has brought his case, and
succeeded before the jury, on a product liability theory. As in the
36. Transport Accident Act (1986) (Vic.).
37. Id § 93.
38. Id.
39. Id § 3(1).
40. See Dickinson v. Motor Vehicle Insurance Trust 163 C.L.R. 500 (1987) (father
covered against liability to own children burned as a result of playing with matches while
left in the car).
41. See Transport Accident Commission v. Treloar, 1 V.R. 447 (1992) (A.D.).
42. Transport Accident Act (1986), as amended by Act of 84, § 5 (1994) (Vic.).
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United States, no Australian jurisdiction retains the common law
forms of action. The plaintiffs claim must, however, state a cause
of action. "Product liability" is not, by itself, a cause of action in
Australian law.43 Its context may, however, indicate the liability
of the plaintiff on some recognized basis. In the hypothetical,
there are only two such bases: (1) a liability at common law, either
in contract or in tort, including terms implied by the sale of goods
legislation of the State in which the incident occurred; and (2) a
liability under statute, specifically, the federal Trade Practices
Act.44
4. Liability at Common Law
MegaFood's liability at common law is founded either in
contract or in tort. In this case, as in so many product liability
cases, it may be possible to erect a concurrent duty in both
contract and tort. Under the contract theory, there could be a
breach of implied warranty of merchantability. But although the
liability for such a breach is strict,45 it is by no means clear that
any such breach has occurred. Even if a breach has occurred,
under the conventional view, exemplary damages are not available
for breach of contract.' Success in a claim for breach of a strict
contractual duty offers Smith a very considerable advantage
because contributory negligence would not be a defense.47 This,
however, might tempt a court to hold that Smith is the author of
his own injury.'
The potential tortious liability in this case rests in negligence
or in MegaFood's failure to adequately warn its customers,
43. In product liability cases, Australian common law has not adopted the strict
liability approach to the basis of obligation that emerged in American law after Greenman
v. Yuba Power Products Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A.
44. Trade Practices Act (1974).
45. See, e.g., Sale of Goods Act §§ 19, 64 (1923) (N.S.W.) (stating that such implied
warranty of merchantability is not excludable in a consumer sale); see also Trade Practices
Act §§ 66(2), 68, 71 (1974) (stating that the similar unexcludable terms are implied into
consumer contracts).
46. See Addis v. Gramophone Co., 1909 App. Cas. 488. Cf Baltic Shipping Co. v.
Dillon, 176 C.L.R. 344 (1993) (recognizing only limited exceptions to the rule that no
damages for distress or other non-pecuniary loss may be recovered for breach of contract).
Justice McHugh, however, foresaw the possible reconsideration of Addis.
47. See Barclays Bank Pic. v. Fairclough Building Ltd., [1994] 3 W.L.R. 1057 (Eng.
C.A.).
48. See March v. E. & M.H. Stramare Pty. Ltd., 171 C.L.R. 506, 512-14, 520 (1991).
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including Smith, of the nature and risk of spilled coffee served at
180 degrees Fahrenheit. A claim of negligence is competent in
Australian law where: (1) the defendant owes the plaintiff a duty
of care in the sense that the defendant stands in a proximate
relationship to the plaintiff to whom injury is reasonably foresee-
able; (2) the defendant has breached that duty; (3) the plaintiff
suffers damage; and (4) the defendant's breach of duty is the cause
of the plaintiff's damage.49 In the case at hand, of course, no
doubt exists that Smith has suffered damage. Other aspects of
Smith's cause of action, however, are not so clear.
Does MegaFood owe Smith a duty of care that it has
breached? The answer is probably in the affirmative. First, in
light of the 750 prior lawsuits and MegaFood's acknowledgment
that customers may not be aware of the risk of spilled coffee
served at 180 degrees Fahrenheit, MegaFood clearly could foresee
personal injury to Smith with whom it stands in a proximate
relationship. Second, in view of the very serious potential
consequences, such as a third degree burn resulting from spilled
coffee served at 180 degrees Fahrenheit, MegaFood is at least
under a duty to warn customers of the potentially harmful
consequences of spillage. After all, the duty to warn is not an
onerous one. Compliance, for example, could take the form of a
sufficiently prominent notice in its retail outlets. Nevertheless,
MegaFood will not likely be prevented from serving coffee at 180
degrees Fahrenheit unless evidence indicates that warnings would
be ineffective despite the serious risk involved with serving hot
coffee.
Assuming that MegaFood has breached a duty of care to
Smith, will that breach be treated as the cause of Smith's loss?
Applying the "but for" test, MegaFood's breach is clearly a cause
of Smith's loss.50 Yet, Smith's own action of placing the coffee
cup between his legs and attempting to remove the lid while
driving may break the chain of causation between MegaFood's
breach of duty and Smith's damages on the basis of a novus actus
interveniens or new intervening force. A new intervening force
breaks the chain of causation between the defendant's conduct and
the plaintiff's damage where the defendant cannot foresee that
49. See R.P. BALKIN & J.L.R. DAVIS, THE LAW OF TORTS, chs. 7-9 (1991).
50. March, 171 C.L.R. at 515-16.
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force and where it is not a part of the ordinary course of events.5'
Here, Smith's conduct amounts to a lack of care for his own safety
and, thus, is not part of the ordinary course of things. Clearly, the
plaintiff's own "negligence" in this sense may constitute a new
intervening force.52 The legal argument against this view is that
MegaFood's duty of care extended to guarding Smith against the
very conduct in which he engaged.53 MegaFood served coffee at
180 degrees Fahrenheit when it was aware of the risks attendant
upon spillage but its customers were not.
Even if Smith's conduct does not constitute a new intervening
force, it still remains relevant in the assessment of damages.
Undoubtedly, Smith's conduct is "negligent" in the sense that he
failed to take reasonable care for his own safety. In all Australian
jurisdictions, such pre-injury contributory negligence operates by
statute to reduce the compensatory damages recoverable by
Smith.54 This means that if the court, having regard for notions
of causality and moral blameworthiness, 55 determines that Smith
is thirty percent, fifty percent or eighty percent responsible for the
damage that he suffered, the court will reduce Smith's damages by
that percentage. This is true even of damages given solely for the
purpose of compensating for medical and hospital expenses
attributable to the injury.
5. Liability Under the Trade Practices Act
An alternative basis for MegaFood's liability is found in Part
VA of the Trade Practices Act of 1974 ("TPA"), which deals inter
alia with the liability of manufacturers for defective goods.
5 6
Section 75AD of the TPA imposes liability on a corporation for
injuries suffered as a result of defective goods manufactured and
supplied to individuals. "Supplied" encompasses the sale of
goods, 57 while "manufactured" includes "extracted," "produced,"
51. Id. at 517-18.
52. Caterson v. Comm'n for Railways, 128 C.L.R. 99 (1972).
53. March v. E. & M.H. Stramare Pty. Ltd., 171 C.L.R. 506, 518-19 (1991).
54. BALKIN & DAVIS, supra note 49, at 337-58.
55. See Pennington v. Norris, 96 C.L.R. 10 (1956) (Austl.); Podrebersek v. Australian
Iron & Steel Pty. Ltd., 59 A.L.R. 529 (1985) (Austl.).
56. Part V.A. was added to the Trade Practices Act by the Trade Practices
Amendment Act (1992), which commenced on July 9, 1992. It thus is relatively new, and
no significant case law has yet developed around it.
57. Trade Practices Act § 4(1) (1974).
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and "processed, 58 and seems to cover the making of a cup of
coffee. For the purposes of the provision in question, goods are
"defective" if "their safety is not such as persons are generally
entitled to expect."59  Thus, the test focuses on the objective
knowledge and expectations of the community rather than the
injured party's subjective knowledge and expectations.' In
applying the test, the TPA specifies that all relevant circumstances
must be considered,61 including the manner and the purposes of
the marketed goods,6' their packaging,63 any instructions or
warnings in relation to the goods,6 and what might reasonably be
expected to be done with or in relation to the good 6 In our
hypothetical case, it clearly is arguable that, in light of the serious
and known consequences of spilled coffee, MegaFood's failure to
warn of the dangers of coffee served at 180 degrees Fahrenheit
66
and the hazards of misuse67 constitute, for the purposes of section
75AD of the TPA, "instructional defects ' 68 in the goods supplied.
The prima facie advantage of Smith's being able to rely on
MegaFood's liability under the TPA, rather than under the general
law of negligence, is that liability under the TPA is strict. The
TPA, however, also makes clear that MegaFood's liability in
damages is reducible to the extent to which Smith's loss can be
attributable both to the defect in the goods and to Smith's own act
or omission.69 This is similar to the reduction of damages for
contributory negligence.7' Therefore, in light of Smith's own
carelessness, Australian courts are likely to reduce any compensa-
tion obtainable under the TPA. Indeed, Smith may be seen as the
instrument of his own loss and receive no compensation at all.71
58. Trade Practices Amendment Act § 75AA (1992).
59. I& § 75AC(1).
60. Explanatory Memorandum to the Trade Practices Amendment Bill 1992 14.
61. Trade Practices Amendment Act § 75AC(2) (1974).
62. Id. § 75AC(2)(a).
63. Id § 75AC(2)(b).
64. Id. § 75AC(2)(d).
65. Id. § 75AC(2)(e) (1974).
66. See Explanatory Memorandum to the Trade Practices Amendment Bill 1992 1 18.
67. Id. 1 19.
68. See id. 1 14 for the classification of defects for the purposes of Part V.A.
69. Trade Practices Amendment Act § 75AN(1) (1974).
70. BALKIN & DAVIS, supra note 49.
71. Section 75AN of the Trade Practices Amendment Act (1974) provides that "the
amount of the loss is to be reduced to such extent [which may be to nil] as the court thinks
fit having regard to [the injured person's] share in causing the loss."
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III. THE RECOVERY OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IN
AusTRALiAN LAW
In the absence of any authoritative declaration in Australian
law equivalent to Lord Devlin's restatement, an analysis of the
cases can only isolate the general factors that courts take into
account in deciding whether or not to make an award of exempla-
ry damages.72 These factors are the defendant's conduct, the
plaintiff's cause of action, and the purpose served by an award of
exemplary damages under all the circumstances of the case.
A. The Defendant's Conduct
In Australian law, defendants are only liable for conduct that
amounts to conscious wrongdoing in contumelious disregard of
another's rights.73 Smith will have no difficulty demonstrating
that MegaFood's conduct was conscious because MegaFood did
not act under any disability.74 Smith's real difficulty will be to
establish that MegaFood acted in "contumelious disregard" of his
rights, since this implies conduct amounting to a high-handed,
insolent, vindictive or malicious invasion of his rights.7" For
example, contumelious disregard occurs where the defendant
deliberately causes physical injury to the plaintiff and, having done
so, remains indifferent to the plaintiff's plight.76
If MegaFood's conduct amounts to a breach of duty, either at
common law or under the TPA, that breach consists of its failure
to warn of the dangers of coffee spilled at 180 degrees Fahrenheit.
In light of the 750 lawsuits brought against it in the past ten years,
MegaFood clearly was aware of the potential for serious bums
72. TILBURY, supra note 34, at ch. 5.
73. See Whitfeld v. De Lauret & Co. Ltd., 29 C.L.R. 71, 77 (1920) (Austl.). See also
Uren v. John Fairfax & Sons Pty. Ltd., 117 C.L.R. 118, 129, 147, 154 (1966) (Austl.);
Australian Consolidated Press Ltd. v. Uren, 117 C.L.R. 221, 232 (1967) (Austl.), [1969] 1
App. Cas. 590, 635; XL Petroleum (N.S.W.) Pty. Ltd. v. Caltex Oil (Austl.) Pty. Ltd., 155
C.L.R. 448, 471 (1985) (Austl.).
74. TILBURY, supra note 34, at 259.
75. Uren v. John Fairfax & Sons Pty. Ltd., 117 C.L.R. 118, 129 (1966) (Austl.).
76. Lamb v. Cotogno, 164 C.L.R. 1 (1987) (Austl.) (defendant liable in exemplary
damages where he had deliberately injured plaintiff by driving a motor car into him and
then abandoned him in pain at the side of the road). Note that the effect of this decision
was reversed by the legislature, which has prohibited the award of exemplary damages in
New South Wales in actions against owners and drivers of motor vehicles. Motor
Accidents Act § 81A (1988) (N.S.W.).
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caused by spilling hot coffee. Because the evidence establishes
that MegaFood simply was responding to consumer demand, its
persistence in serving coffee at that temperature can hardly be
regarded as an arrogant or high-handed disregard of customers'
rights. The failure to warn, however, is not so easily dismissed.
MegaFood is aware that its customers may not fully apprehend the
danger of spilled coffee served at 180 degrees Fahrenheit. Is
MegaFood's failure to warn a "contumelious disregard" of its
customers' rights? The answer depends on proof of further facts
relating to the question of why MegaFood failed to warn its
customers. Two possible reasons suggest themselves. On the one
hand, MegaFood simply may have failed to address itself to the
issue, although this seems implausible in light of the prior 750
claims. If this is true, however, the fact that MegaFood ought to
have addressed the issue will not be sufficient to hold it liable in
exemplary damages.77 On the other hand, MegaFood may have
addressed the issue and deliberately decided not to issue warnings.
If the latter is true, then we need to know the rationale behind the
decision. MegaFood, for example, may have been acting on legal
advice that warnings were not necessary or that, regardless of the
potentially serious injury to customers, warnings would have an
adverse effect on sales. Only the latter explanation will bring
MegaFood's conduct within the category of "contumelious
disregard of another's rights."
B. The Plaintiffs Cause of Action
Assuming that the evidence establishes that MegaFood has
acted in "contumelious disregard" of Smith's rights, Smith still may
have to show that MegaFood is liable to him in a cause of action
that would entitle Smith to exemplary damages. The word "may"
in the last sentence must be emphasized because, in this respect,
Australian law remains as unclear as English law, notwithstanding
the rejection of Rookes v. Barnard in Australia.78
The difficulty arises in this way. Before Rookes, exemplary
damages were recoverable in a number of nominate torts, mainly
intentional torts. Lord Devlin's restatement in Rookes limited the
77. See Midalco Pty. Ltd. v. Rabenalt, 1989 V.R. 461 (stating that making the
defendant, who ought to have known of risks to the plaintiff, liable in exemplary damages
was wrong).
78. Rookes v. Barnard, 1964 App. Cas. 1126.
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recoverability of exemplary damages to three situations that he
described without reference to the plaintiff's cause of action.79
Nevertheless, the weight of English authority after Rookes has held
that exemplary damages are recoverable only in those torts in
which exemplary damages were recoverable before Rookes.s°
This development gives effect to Rookes' underlying policy of
narrowly confining the circumstances under which exemplary
damages are claimable. It also reflects a particular desire that
exemplary damages should not become available in breach of
contract cases.81
This debate is irrelevant in Australia where the restatement
proposed in Rookes has been rejected. Yet, the debate sometimes
emerges in another form. In the very case that rejected Lord
Devlin's restatement, two Justices of the High Court of Australia
seem to take the view that exemplary damages are only available
in certain classes of torts.82 If this is correct, it creates an addi-
tional barrier for Smith's claim because prior to Rookes, no
authority existed for awarding exemplary damages in negligence
cases. Indeed, the assumption undoubtedly was that such damages
were not recoverable in negligence.
The better view, however, is that Australian law does not
restrict the availability of exemplary damages based on the
plaintiff's cause of action. Other than an unarticulated desire to
restrict the availability of exemplary damages, no reason would
support such a rule. Rather, restrictions on the recoverability of
exemplary damages are found logically in the defendant's conduct.
The plaintiff's cause of action is only relevant to the extent that
conduct of the requisite type is more likely to manifest itself in
intentional torts, rather than negligence or breach of contract.'
79. See supra text accompanying note 24.
80. See A.B. v. South West Water Services Ltd., 1993 Q.B. 507. Cf. ENGLISH LAW
COMM'N, AGGRAVATED, EXEMPLARY AND RESTITUTIONARY DAMAGES 137 (Consulta-
tion Paper No. 132, 1993) [hereinafter ENGLISH L. COMM'N].
81. Exemplary damages have been awarded in cases of deceit in Australia. See Musca
v. Astle Corp. Pty. Ltd., 80 A.L.R. 251 (1988); Broken Hill Proprietary Co. Ltd. v. Fisher,
38 S.A. St. R. 50 (1984). It is a short step from these cases to the award of exemplary
damages in contract. See Vorvis v. Insurance Corp. of British Columbia, 1 S.C.R. 1085
(1989).
82. See Uren v. John Fairfax & Sons Pty. Ltd., 117 C.L.R. 118, 154 (1966) (Austl.)
(Windeyer, J.). See also idt at 158 (Owen, J.).
83. See MAYNE & MCGREGOR ON DAMAGES 197 (12th ed. 1961).
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As Justice O'Bryan of the Supreme Court of Victoria recently
stated, "the criteria for the award of exemplary damages is [sic]
found in the conduct of the wrongdoer and not in the nature of
the tort."' Indeed, in the case in which this passage appears,
Justice O'Bryan held that, as a matter of law, exemplary damages
are recoverable in an action for negligence where the conduct of
the defendant is of the requisite type. He acknowledged, however,
that where negligence is the cause of action, the defendant's
conduct would not normally merit an award of exemplary
damages. Indeed, cases in which this will occur will be "unusual
and rare."'85  A possible example is Midalco Pty. Ltd. v.
Rabenalt,16 an earlier decision of the Full Court of the Supreme
Court of Victoria. In Midalco Pty. Ltd., the employer negligently
exposed the plaintiff employee to asbestos dust over a number of
years resulting in the plaintiff contracting mesothelioma. By
reason of defendant's concession, the court awarded (in principle)
exemplary damages against the employer whose negligence
amounted to a wilful blindness.
If these authorities are followed, provided that MegaFood is
liable to the plaintiff in negligence and its conduct amounts to
conscious wrongdoing in contumelious disregard of Smith's rights,
MegaFood will not avoid exemplary damages on the simple basis
that Smith's claim is in negligence. On the other hand, if
MegaFood's liability is based upon Part VA of the TPA, MegaFo-
od will not be liable for exemplary damages. MegaFood's liability
would spring from section 75AD of the TPA, which authorizes
only the "compensation" of the plaintiff, thereby excluding
exemplary damages. The support for this conclusion is found by
analogy in sections 82 and 87 of the TPA, which deal respectively
with the award of damages and discretionary damages. These
sections refer to the plaintiff recovering for "loss" or "damage,"
expressions that denote "compensation." Exemplary damages are
not recoverable under these sections.
84. Coloca v. B.P. Australia Ltd., 2 V.R. 441, 445 (1992).
85. Id. at 448.
86. 1989 V.R. 461.
87. Musca v. Astle Corporation Pty. Ltd., 80 A.L.R. 251, 262 (1988).
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C. The Purpose of Exemplary Damages
In principle, Australian courts will not award exemplary
damages where such awards cannot serve the purpose of punishing
and deterring."8 For example, the courts will not award exempla-
ry damages to censure a defendant whose conduct has already
been punished by the criminal law.8 9 The courts, however, take
a liberal view of the ability of exemplary damages to punish and
deter. For example, a colorable argument could be made that if
MegaFood's liability to Smith is covered under an insurance policy,
courts should not award exemplary damages since MegaFood will
not feel the sting of an award paid by its insurer. It is clear that
Australian courts will not entertain this argument. 9  One may
also argue that awarding exemplary damages may not deter
because MegaFood will continue to serve coffee at the same
temperature as it always has. This argument is irrelevant for two
reasons. First, it does not address the breach of duty for which
MegaFood may be liable.91 Exemplary damages may well deter
MegaFood from failing to issue warnings to customers in the
future. Second, whatever its effect on MegaFood, the award may
well have a deterrent effect on those who engage in conduct
similar to that of MegaFood. 2
IV THE OBJECrIONS TO EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
Although Australian courts are not as hesitant as their English
counterparts to award exemplary damages, the recovery of such
damages is at least limited to cases where the defendant engages
in conscious wrongdoing in contumelious disregard of another's
rights.93 As a consequence of this limitation there have been few
claims made for exemplary damages and even fewer awards.94
While policy reasons for curtailing the availability of exemplary
88. This is implicit in the decision of the High Court in Lamb v. Cotogno, 164 C.L.R.
1 (1987) (Austl.).
89. Watts v. Leitch, 1973 Tas. S.R. 16. Cf. Canterbury Bankstown Rugby League
Football Club Ltd. v. Rogers, 1993 Austl. Torts Rep. 81-246.
90. See Lamb v. Cotogno, 164 C.L.R. 1, 8 (1987) (Austi.).
91. See supra Part II.C.
92. See Lamb v. Cotogno, 164 C.L.R. 1, 8 (1987) (Austl.).
93. See supra Part III.A.
94. See Flowfill Packaging Machines Pty. Ltd. v. Fytfore Pty. Ltd., 1993 Austi. Torts
Rep. 81-244.
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damages in the United States are grounded in economic analysis,
Australian courts generally do not rely on such analysis.9'
Rather, policy explanations are found in distinctions between civil
and criminal law.
According to this argument, punishment is pre-eminently the
function of the criminal law. As such, it is carried out at the
insistence of the State, which exacts the appropriate penalty.
Because criminal punishment can have devastating consequences
for individuals, criminal law has evidential and procedural
safeguards to protect the accused.' From this perspective,
making punishment the objective of an award of civil damages is
dangerous because the safeguards designed to protect the accused
in criminal trials often do not exist in civil actions. That punish-
ment should be the object of damages is also anomalous for at
least two reasons. First, the progressive development of the law
of damages has been toward the consolidation and refinement of
the principle of compensation,98 thereby highlighting the distinct
functions of the civil and criminal law. Second, it allows punish-
ment to be effected at the insistence of the plaintiff who collects
the "fine" imposed by the court. Effectively, the State abnegates
its role as the exacter of punishment on behalf of the community,
allowing the plaintiff to "profit" from the punishment of the
defendant. Australians find this inappropriate. 99
95. Sir Anthony Mason, Chief Justice of Australia, has remarked on the difficulties
a court has in coping with such evidence. Law and Economics, 17 MONASH U. L. REV.
167, 174 (1991). He concludes that he has "serious misgivings" about the application or
adoption of economic analysis and finds that it is merely "another voice questioning
tentative conclusions and suggesting possible alternatives." Id. at 181.
96. The classic statement of this approach is found in Lord Reid's speech in Broom
v. Cassell & Co. Ltd., 1972 App. Cas. 1027, 1087. Law Reform bodies in Australia have
also tended to put arguments against exemplary damages on this basis. See NEW SOUTH
WALES LAW REFORM COMM'N, REPORT OF THE LAW REFORM COMMISSION ON
DEFAMATION 12-14 (L.R.C. 11, 1971); LAW REFORM COMM'N OF TASMANIA, COMPENSA-
TION FOR VICTIMS OF MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS 45-46 (Report No. 52, 1987);
AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMM'N, PRODUCT LIABILITY 104-106 (ALRC 51, 1989);
VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM'N, PRODUCT LIABILITY 104-106 (Report No. 27, 1989).
97. Procedural safeguards such as the privilege against self-incrimination, the
requirement that the standard of proof be beyond reasonable doubt, and the State's
responsibility for ensuring a fair trial of the accused. NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM
COMM'N, supra note 96, at 12-13.
98. See S.M. Waddams, The Principle of Compensation, in ESSAYS ON DAMAGES ch.
1 (P.D. Finn ed., 1992).
99. NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM COMM'N, supra note 96, at 12.
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The greater willingness of Australian courts to award
exemplary damages in recent cases perhaps will lead to a reap-
praisal of some of these arguments. Indeed, much will be
questioned. First, whatever the theory, it is doubtful that damages
are solely compensatory." ° Similar to the "vindictive" element
in defamation damages, damages measured by reference to the
defendant's gain, so called "restitutionary damages," are increas-
ingly recognized as falling outside the compensatory principle.10'
Second, the evidentiary protection of criminal law, which the
defendant loses in a claim for exemplary damages, is the require-
ment that the State prove the elements of the wrong beyond
reasonable doubt. The fact that proof in a civil claim is on the
balance of probabilities, however, does not necessarily mean that
the defendant is insufficiently protected. It has long been
recognized in Australian law that, while there is no third standard
of proof between the civil and criminal standards, evidence that
will satisfy the civil standard in any case is dependent on the
nature and consequences of the fact or facts to be proved.l2
Thus, where a particular finding would bring grave consequences,
it is more difficult to persuade the court to a "reasonable satisfac-
tion" on the balance of probabilities. 3 Third, it must be re-
membered that courts are ultimately the guardians of their own
procedures via their inherent powers. This enables them to
regulate proceedings in such a way as to secure a fair trial for both
parties." In the context of a claim for exemplary damages, this
means that the court can ensure compliance with such procedural
safeguards as are necessary to protect the defendant from unjust
punishment. Fourth, the stigma associated with a criminal
conviction is not usually present when exemplary damages are
awarded in a civil action.'
100. Waddams, supra note 98, at 13.
101. See Michael Tilbury, Factors Inflating Damages Awards, in ESSAYS ON DAMAGES
ch. 5 (P.D. Finn ed., 1992). See also Carson v. John Fairfax & Sons Ltd., 178 C.L.R. 44
(1993) (Austl.).
102. Briginshaw v. Briginshaw, 60 C.L.R. 336 (1938) (Austl.).
103. Id. at 362-63 (Dixon, J.).
104. See Justice Kirby's dissenting judgment in Esanda Finance Corp. v. Carnie, 29
N.S.W.L.R. 382 (1992). The conclusion reached by Justice Kirby recently has been
affirmed on appeal in an unreported decision. Carnie v. Esanda Fin. Corp., High Court
of Australia, Feb. 23, 1995 (stating courts have power to regulate the procedures applicable
to representative actions to authorize what is effectively a class action).
105. See ENGLISH LAW COMM'N, supra note 80, 5.32.
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V. THE AMOUNT OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
In the hypothetical, the jury awarded Smith $3.5 million in
exemplary damages. If an award of exemplary damages in this
case were made pursuant to Australian law, an appellate court
undoubtedly would reverse it regardless of whether that award
came from a jury or a judge. The appellate court would interfere
with the verdict on the basis of error if such was detectible in the
judge's instructions to the jury or otherwise revealed in the judge's
own reasoning.'0° Assuming there was no such error, then, in
the case of a jury verdict, the amount would be set aside because
an award of $3.5 million is so exorbitant as to be regarded as
inappropriate under these circumstances."°  In short, such an
award could not reasonably be awarded by a properly instructed
jury.'08 In the case of an award by a judge alone, the amount is
disproportionate to the circumstances of the case.'O°
Authority provides four guidelines for assessing exemplary
damages that would lead to the foregoing conclusions. In the
circumstances of this case, however, these guidelines are inconclu-
sive.
First, clearly some award in addition to compensatory
damages must be granted to Smith for the purpose of punishing
MegaFood. This is so because compensatory damages of $100,000
cannot alone act as a sufficient deterrent to MegaFood. If they
could, no exemplary damages would ever be awarded. ° Second,
moderation must be exercised in fixing the amount of exemplary
damages."' Third, all circumstances aggravating or mitigating
the defendant's conduct are relevant to the award.1 2 Thus, for
example, if Smith had provoked MegaFood's conduct, that
provocation would reduce any exemplary award." 3 In this case,
a factor that could operate to effect a significant reduction of any
106. LuNTz, supra note 30, at 529-31, 534-38.
107. See Carson v. John Fairfax & Sons Ltd., 178 C.L.R. 44, 61-62 (1993) (Austl.)
(awarding compensatory, including aggravated damages, in a defamation case).
108. LUNTz, supra note 30, at 525-28.
109. ld. at 534-35.
110. Rookes v. Barnard, 1964 App. Cas. 1129, 1228.
111. Id. at 1227-28; see also XL Petroleum (N.S.W.) Pty. Ltd. v. Caltex Oil (Austl.) Pty.
Ltd., 155 C.L.R. 448, 463 (1985).
112. Rookes, 1964 App. Cas. at 1228.
113. See Fontin v. Katapodis, 108 C.L.R. 177 (1962) (Austl.).
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exemplary award is that Smith is largely the instrument of his own
wrong." 4  Indeed, such a reduction may be required more
directly by reason of the provisions of the contributory negligence
statutes in force in all Australian jurisdictions.'15 Those statutory
provisions are capable of encompassing exemplary damages,
with the effect of reducing the amount of exemplary damages to
such an extent as the court thought just and equitable in light of
Smith's share in the responsibility for the damage. Fourth, the
court must consider the defendant's means since the defendant
must pay a sufficiently large amount to ensure its punishment and
deterrence.1 7 In a case such as this where the defendant is the
world's largest fast food chain, this factor would seem to argue for
a substantial award to ensure that punishment and deterrence are
actually achieved. But, even if the $3.5 million represented only
one percent of MegaFood's net operating profit after tax, it would
still be excessive. Such an amount could justifiably be seen as
allowing Smith to profit from MegaFood's wrong. To the extent
to which it is permissible to look at awards in other cases,118 this
conclusion is supported by the High Court's opinion in XL
Petroleum (NS.W.) Pty. Ltd. v. Caltex Oil (Austl.) Pty. Ltd.," 9 in
which an award of $150,000 in exemplary damages was upheld.
This amount had been substituted by the New South Wales Court
of Appeal for a jury verdict of $400,000, which represented one
percent of the defendant's operating profit after tax. XL Petro-
leum was a much stronger case for exemplary damages than
Smith's case against MegaFood because, in XL Petroleum, the
defendant deliberately trespassed on the plaintiff's land for the
purpose of causing damage to the plaintiff's business and proceed-
ed to do so in a high-handed fashion.
114. See supra Part II.C.
115. See BALKIN & DAVIS, supra note 49.
116. On the one hand, the statutes speak of "damages," an expression which clearly
encompasses "exemplary damages." On the other hand, the reference in the statutes to
the defendant's share in responsibility for the damage at issue may be seen as limiting the
reference to "damages" to compensatory damages an argument which may be supportable
by appealing to the intention of the legislature and the policies underlying the statute. The
English Law Commission regards the application of the contributory negligence statutes
to exemplary damages as "arguable." See ENGLISH LAW COMM'N, supra note 80, at 88.
117. Rookes v. Barnard, 1964 App. Cas. 1129, 1228; XL Petroleum (N.S.W.) Pty. Ltd.
v. Caltex Oil (Austl.) Pty. Ltd., 155 C.L.R. 448, 472 (1985) (Austl.).
118. See infra text accompanying notes 118-24.
119. XL Petroleum, 155 C.L.R. at 472.
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We have no doubt as to the correctness of our conclusion that
any Australian appellate court would reverse an award of $3.5
million in exemplary damages in this case. We have reached our
conclusion by directly applying the factors that the courts have
spelled out as relevant to the quantum of an award of exemplary
damages to the facts and circumstances of this case. It is unrealis-
tic, however, to suggest that our conclusion is not informed by a
knowledge of the general level of damages awards, both compen-
satory and exemplary, that apply in Australia.
Although there is High Court authority against comparing
awards in personal injury cases to determine the amount of non-
pecuniary damages,"2 a tariff of non-pecuniary loss exists in all
Australian jurisdictions.' The basis for this assault on the High
Court's stance against comparisons with awards in other cases has
now been provided by the Court itself. The Court is attempting
to set a tariff of sorts in defamation cases by requiring that in
assessing damages for non-economic loss, a trial judge and a
jury" must have regard for awards in personal injury cases. The
purpose of this comparison is to ensure that the scale of awards for
non-economic loss in cases of serious personal injury will transcend
the amounts awarded for injury to reputation.'2
The highest amount awarded as exemplary damages in
negligent personal injury cases is $250,000.1 In intentional
personal injury cases, the awards have been much more modest,
usually below $10,000.1' In defamation cases, exemplary awards
are seldom made2 6 and tend not to exceed $50,000.127 Extend-
ing the comparison to defamation cases that include an aggravated
120. Planet Fisheries Pty. Ltd. v. La Rosa, 119 C.L.R. 118 (1968) (Austl.).
121. LUNTz, supra note 30, at 166-68, 507-10.
122. The view espoused in Carson, that awards in comparable cases can be put to the
jury, is technically obiter dicta and was not followed by Justice Levine in the retrial of this
action. See Carson v. John Fairfax & Sons Ltd. 34 N.S.W.L.R. 72, 59 (1994). In New
South Wales, the task of assessment of damages in defamation actions has now been taken
from the jury and given to the court. Defamation Act § 7A(4)(b) (1974) (N.S.W.).
123. Carson v. John Fairfax & Sons Ltd., 178 C.L.R. 44, 61-62 (1993) (Austl.).
124. Midalco Pty. Ltd. v. Rabenalt, 1989 V.R. 461.
125. See, e.g., Lamb v. Cotogno, 164 C.L.R. 1 (1987) (Austl.) (awarding $5,000).
126. Most defamation litigation in Australia takes place in New South Wales where
exemplary damages cannot be awarded in defamation cases. Defamation Act § 46(3)(a)
(1974) (N.S.W.).
127. See The Quantum of Damages in Australian Defamation Trials, GAZETTE OF L.
& JOURNALISM, Nov. 1993, at 3-19; see also Table of Quantum Update, GAZETTE OF L.
& JOURNALISM, Nov. 1994, at 2-4.
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compensatory element in the damages, an element that provides
the nearest analogy to exemplary damages, awards are usually
below $100,000.1
VI. CONCLUSION
If we were judges sitting on appeal from this award in
Australia, we undoubtedly would have to set aside the award of
exemplary damages. We would set aside both the exemplary and
compensatory damages insofar as Smith failed to establish that he
had a case against MegaFood in contract, negligence, or under the
Trade Practices Act. If Smith succeeded in establishing
MegaFood's liability on any basis, we would set aside the award of
exemplary damages if MegaFood's liability were based solely on
contract or the Trade Practices Act. If MegaFood's liability were
based on negligence, we would need further evidence before
satisfying ourselves that MegaFood acted consciously in contumeli-
ous disregard of Smith's rights so as to justify the award of
exemplary damages.
Even if that evidence were forthcoming, we would, in the end,
set aside the award of $3.5 million as perverse because its amount
far exceeds what could be reasonably awarded as exemplary
damages under Australian law in a case such as this. The facts of
Smith's case simply do not merit the highest exemplary damages
award ever granted in Australian law.
128. In the past, the High Court has upheld one award of $150,000. Coyne v. Citizen
Finance Ltd., 172 C.L.R. 211 (1991) (Austl.). The High Court, however, also has
overturned another award of $600,000. Carson v. John Fairfax & Sons Ltd., 178 C.L.R.
44 (1993) (Austl.) (where the award was in respect of two closely related defamatory
publications).
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